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University of Florida
Over the course of the past decade, and particularly since the fall of the
Berlin Wall, a much noted wave of democratization has swept over the world.
From Argentina to Zambia, Bangkok to Bamako, authoritarian regimes have
been challenged and forced to yield to popular governments legitimized by free
elections. Considered in conjunction with the demise of the Soviet Union, these
events have led some observers to speculate that democracy, and specifically its
classically liberal form, has become the universal political ideal.

Literary Theory and Critical Teaching.
Ccedmon Staddon on Callinicos' The Revenge ofHistory:

159

Marxism and Eastern European Revolutions,
Poznanski's Constructing Capitalism: The Reemergence of Civil Society and Liberal Economy
in the Post-Communist World, and Przeworski's
Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic
Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America.

Perhaps the most celebrated example of such theorizing is Francis
Fukuyama's article entitled, "The End of History." Published in the National
Interest in 1989, Fukuyama's article created a considerable intellectual stir.
Informed by the thought of the German philosopher George F. W. Hegel, the
authorargued thatliberaldemocracy"mayconstitutetheendpointofmankind's
ideological evolution," and as such, would be the final form of human government. History in the Hegelian sense had come to an end, since the ideal, though
not necessarily the implementation, of liberal democracy could not be improved upon. 1
Fukuyama's article engendered a number of skeptical responses, not the
least of which was the contention that liberal democracy's appeal was hardly
universal. Recent events notwithstanding, political scientists such as Elie
Kedourie have suggested that the values and traditions of many non-Western
nations are incompatible with the requirements of democracy.2 On the other
hand, theorists from the developing world, such as Julius Nyerere and Kenneth
Kaunda, have argued thatauthentic democracies arenotuniversally liberal, but
instead vary according to the culture in which they exist. 3 Both of these
positions imply that liberal democracy is a distinctly Western construct, whose
claims to universal validity are undermined by an appreciation of the culturally
relative nature of political norms and values.
And yet democracy currently appears to be a cross-cultural standard of
political legitimacy. As Giovanni Sartori has noted, no nation claims to be antidemocratic.4 How can we reconcile the claims of cultural relativism seen in the
work of Kedourie and Nyerere with the outbreak of liberal democratic government all over the world? The answer to this question may lie with the increasing
acceptance worldwide of a universal standard of human rights.

Fukuyama Revisited
Fukuyama, however, has a different explanation for the cross-cultural
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embrace of liberal democracy. In The End ofHistory and the Last Man, he poin~s
totheriseofthescientificmethodduringtheEnlightenmentandthetechnolog1cal revolution which ensued. Technological advances led to new forms of
economic organization and the eventual ~cendancy o~ a parti~ar ~conomic
structure: the market, or liberal, economy. The supenor organizational efficiency and technology of liberal economies are now self-evident and universally appreciated.
Liberal economies lead to liberal democracies as a result of what Fukuyama
terms the universal drive for "status recognition." All humans possess a
longing for recognition, status, or a certain degre~of sod~ distin~~n. ~ukuy~
argues that as nations embrace liberal economlcs, the mdustr1aliz.atton wh~ch
results inevitably produces a more educated and wealthy populace. Increasing
education and social mobility promote the spread of egalitarian ideas as well as
a demand for recognition from society and its government. Liberal democracy
emerges from this process as the best possible political answer to the demands
for status recognition, equality, and free-market economics. While Fukuyama
admits that liberal democracy has its flaws, the increasing number of liberal
democratic states, particularly in the industrialized "first" world, is held to
constitute the universal recognition that liberal democracy is the most "rational" form of human government.
Fukuyama has in effect built on the work of early scholars in the field of
development studies, such as Seymour Martin Lipset and Walt Rostow. 5 By
adding a psychological universal, i.e. the drive towards status recognition,
Fukuyama's theory rests on a presupposition regarding human nature open to
debate. Even if one accepts this assumption, The End ofHistory does little to help
us understand why nations such as Paraguay, Benin, and Bangladesh have all
adopted liberal democratic regimes, three nations whose only commonality
may be their largely pre-industrial economies. Nor can the author explain why
an inegalitarian society such as India has managed to guard its "post-historical"
liberal democratic institutions for the past forty-five years. In passing, one
might note that given the delicate state of the global environment, the sort of
Westernized industrialization that Fukuyama envisions on a worldwide basis
may give "the end of history" a whole new meaning. Reservations with regards
to Fukuyama's assessment of the triumph of liberal democracy are not without
reason.
An Alternative Tact

While Fukuyama's theory may or may not give insight into recent political
changes in relatively developed nations such as South Korea or Chile, the rise
of liberal democratic regimes in many of the world's less advanced countries
can be more accurately explained by a different dynamic. Many of these
democratic revolutions appear to be driven as much by a popular desire to
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empower governments which respect basic international standards of human
rights than by the arrival at a particular stage of economic development. This
observation is especially relevant in Africa, where a score of nations have
undergone unprecedented liberalization and/ or democratization during the
past five years. As Bratton and Van De Walle have observed, these changes have
occurred despite stagnant, if not deteriorating, economic performances by
I.
states across much of the continent for over two decades.6 While obviously
hopeful that new regimes would facilitate economic development, the popular
movements which sprung up to challenge the authoritarian status quo were
often united primarily by their opposition to political oppression and corrupi tion. 7 Their goals were the establishment of democratic polities which respected basic human rights and provided for a degree of political accountability, regardless of their economic policy. This suggests that the impact of
political variables, and particularly the development of the concept of human
rights, ought to be examined by political scientists as a prime component of the
recent wave of democratization, as opposed to solely economic and presumed
psychological factors.
However, human rights are a concept as subject to the critiques of cultural
relativists as is liberal democracy. There would seem to be a legion of differing
formulations and interpretations stating exactly which rights constitute basic
human rights. But as Jack Donnelly points out in his book, Universal Human
Rights In Theory and Practice, the standards of human rights enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948) and the International Human Rights Covenants (which came into
force in 1976) are recognized by nations around the world, in word if not in
deed. The cross-cultural consensus these standards, known collectively as the
International Bill of Human Rights, reflect is taken to represent certain universal political ideals. These ideals are considered universal owing to the degree
of cross-cultural consensus regarding the indignities and injustices against
which every individual has the right to be protected by virtue of being human.
For example, Articles 3 and 22 of the Universal Declaration protect the right to
life and food respectively, while Articles 4 and 5 protect against slavery, torture,
and other inhuman or degrading treatment. Donnelly argues that the widespread acceptance of the Universal Declaration and the Covenants can be
explained by the fact that this list "responds to the major perceived threats to
human dignity" in the world today. Since any particular formulation of human
rights is a list of the principal threats to human dignity in a given era, Donnelly
expects that human rights standards will continue to evolve and expand in
response to changing ideas of human dignity, as well as the rise of new threats
to these ideas. He goes on to argue that the universal recognition of human
rights renders legitimate only those sorts of political regimes which insure their
respect.8
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question. As Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im points out, "Society is never an
entity separable from the individuals who compose it." He goes on to note that,
"No civilization has in it any element which in the last analysis is not the
contribution of an individual. Where else could any trait come from except
from the behavior of a man or a woman or a child?" 10 Thus, cultures do not have
an independent existence. Rather, they exist in flux, as the evolving mental
constructs, world views, and behavioral norms of a given society. While many
aspects of a given culture are consistently passed down from generation to
generation, all cultures continually incorporate the ideas, habits, and values
among its contemporary members. As an example, one may examine the
history of colonialism in Great Britain. In 1905, the majority of English
considered colonialism in the non-Western world perfectly acceptable, so much
so that it was taken for granted by British subjects. But by 1945, the colonial ideal
was becoming increasingly disputed with.i n the United Kingdom, and by 1985,
it was no longer seriously entertained. British cultural attitudes changed as a
result of an evolution in the views of individual English subjects.

Donnelly's approach is not without its critics. Adamantia Pollis and Peter
Schwab argue in their book, Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives,
that there is no universal concurrence on the meaning of human rights. Rather,
the standards of human rights represented by the International Bill of Human
Rights are a particularly Western interpretation of the concept, grounded in a
cultural heritage of individualism alien to much of the non-Western world.
From this perspective, any attempt to justify a given p olitical system by virtue
of its respect for human rights would be culturally biased. For human rights do
not substantiate any universal political ideals, concepts or aspirations.~
Pollis and Schwab also state that concepts of human dignity are so
culturally subjective that little more than vague generalities can be made about
cross-cultural similarities. Political norms and values vary from society to
society, and the outside observer is in no position to pass judgement on the
standards of an alien culture. Any universal list of human rights is then suspect,
as in all likelihood such a list reflects a particular, subjective conception of
political, social, or economic threats to a dignified life. While the human rights
ideals which the West commonly accepts may more or less perfectly represent
Western standards of human dignity, other conceptions of human dignity and
human rights are just as valid.

Once one recognizes that cultures are not static, any attempt to hold
regimes who violate a given human rights standard accountable to their own
cultural norms becomes problematic. If Mao's Great Leap Forward could be
said to respect and reflect the changed, Revolutionary morality of hundreds of
millions of Chinese, attempts to apply pre-Communist cultural norms would
be out of place.11 Claims of a similar nature might invariably be made by the Pol
Pots and Hitlers who plague our world. Those wishing to depend on differing
cultural concepts of human dignity can give no moral rejoinder to the assertion,
"that's just the way we do things around here now," without first undertaking
extensive empirical research in an attempt to refute it.

A Critique of Cultural Relativism
At first glance, such arguments appear convincing to any reader who
appreciates the culturally relative nature of norms and values. However, the
ramifications of such a line of thought are unsettling. If we accept Pollis's and
Schwab's position, do we really have no response to a Pol Pot who claims his
regime reflects authentic Cambodian values? Can we not condemn a cannibalistic Jean Bedel Bokassa for firing upon school children? Are we forced to accept
ldi Amin's attempts at genocide were he to tell us that's just the way things are
done in Uganda? Have we no right to impose our biases, our standards of
human dignity and human rights, on an Islamic regime in Sudan brutally
imposing shari'a law on a Christian and Animist minority?

Though dearly an impractical task, rationalizations by such tyrants could
indeed be empirically tested. But what if large numbers of individuals in a
given society actually engage in conduct universally condemned by outsiders?
If, by chance, a majority of Hindus are willing to coerce widows into committing
suttee, the culturally subjective position would be to condone such practices. If
a large percentage of Serbs believe actions aimed at "ethnic cleansing" are
morally acceptable, the relativist has no ground on which to condemn them. If
a theocratic Iranian government wishes to place a bounty on the head of a writer
who has insulted Islam, the Ayatollahs may well be acting in a In.armer
consistent with contemporary Persian conceptions of justice. Once we recognize that cultural norms exist only in the minds of the individuals who share
that culture, the implications for the culturally subjective position on human
rights are considerable. For it would seem to mean that any formulations held
by a majority of a given society must be considered valid, morally defensible
constructs of human dignity. If such a society engages in conduct consistent
with these constructs but which violates the human rights stand.a rds of outsid-

In short, without universal standards of political morals and political
norms, have we no choice but to embrace behavior we find despicable, acknowledge actions we abhor, and tum a blind eye to conduct that seems
indefensible? Of course, this is not how cultural relativists choose to pose the
question . Instead, since all societies do appear to have concepts of human
dignity and injustice, one can hold regimes responsible to the standards of the
societies in which they exist. Presumably, that would allow us to condemn the
Idi Amins and Pol Pots according to the political norms of their own cultures.
However, cultural norms and values are not static. They change along with
the opinions and behavior of the indiV!duals who constitute the society in
i
i
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novel situations requiring great effort to maintain familiar patterns of social
relations and inhibit change. 14 Cultural change and stability occur only then
within the context of social relations and social adaptation. In the realm of
human rights, new understandings of human dignity have emerged on a global
basis which are substantiated by new formulations of human rights, conceptions which operate as a mechanism of social adaptation in response to the
historical legacy of the 20th century. As a result of developments which will
shortly be addressed in more detail, what appears to be occurring in much of
the world today is a continuous, if largely imperceptible, process of culture
change. This dynamic has resulted in considerable convergence of cultural
ideals of both human dignity and human rights, which in turn has led to the
success of political movements promoting these ideals.

ers, we might disagree but not condemn.
In order to escape this dilemma, one could of course simply choose to act
on the basis of one's subjective standards of human rights. The Westerner could
simply state, ''This is my conception of human dignity and I am perfectly happy
upholding certain human rights as a defense against threats to this view." Then,
in concert with others, one could attempt to impose those subjective personal
beliefs about human rights on a universal basis. How far such an approach will
get us in today's world is open to question. The attempts to imppse ahuman
rights regime consciously based on any one particular understanding of human
dignity smacks of cultural imperialism. Indeed, it may be counterproductive.
A prime factor contributing to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in much of the
Muslim world would appear to be perceptions of just that sort of cultural
imperialism by the West. 12 The fundamentalist movement expresses a frustration born of the belief that the West is trying to impose its political norms, ideas,
and values on these societies. Thus, the aggressive pursuit of alien concepts of
human dignity and human rights by outsiders may often lead to a destructive
backlash of opinion within the society in question. Perhaps the most troubling
aspect of such a position is that it suggests that those wishing to hold us to their
understandings of human dignity are also justified in seeking to impose their
standards upon us. A Hobbesian battle of all against all amongst competing
human rights regimes is hardly conducive to diminishing threats to human
dignity universally.
An Emerging Universal Human Rights Standard
The dilemma posed by an appreciation of cultural subjectivity for those
wishing to act on a standard of human rights appears unresolvable. However,
as history unfolds this dilemma is becoming less and less important. For it
appears that a cross-cultural convergence is occurring with regard to international standards of human rights. This emerging human rights standard is an
important contributing factor to the recent wave of democratization worldwide, and its influence is particularly profound in many African cases.

How can any particular conception of human rights possibly be representative of political norms cross-culturally? The realization that cultural conceptions of human rights are in fact the aggregate of the views of individuals
sharing that culture opens up a new line of inquiry. The possibility of a middle
ground between the claims of cultural relativists and cultural imperialists may
exist regarding human rights regimes. When individuals in a society collectively change their individual ideas, habits, and values, the standards of their
culture change as well. According to Inglehart, cultural change occurs as an
adaptive response to economic, technological, and political shifts. 13 In fact, as
Wildavskynotes, cultural change and cultural stability are essentially two sides
of the same coin, since individuals in a given culture are continually confronting

7

This suggests that a culturally authentic universal standard of human
rights is emerging. It is a process which is dialectical and subject to change, but
nonetheless, it represents a trend towards a global conjunction of minimal
standards of human dignity. Obviously, its manifestation is more apparent in
Bamako and Seoul than in Belgrade and Teheran. It must also be noted that such
change is more apparent among those who are educated and residing in urban
areas, which may reflect a certain class bias. Such observations demonstrate the
continuing political importance of economic, psychological, social, and historical factors. In this regard, all one can say is that some cultures appear more
amenable to rapid changes of this sort than others. Nevertheless, this trend has
resulted in the increasing acceptance of a cross-cultural understanding of
human rights significantly influenced by Western Europe.
Donnelly suggests that "human rights represent a distinctive set of social
practices tied to particular notions of human dignity that initially arose in the
modem West in response to the social changes produced by modem states and
modem capitalist market economies. " 15 The spread of similar changes to other
partsof theworld facilitated their adoption universally. However,a globalization
of conceptions of human dignity appears to be manifest even in societies with
weak, ineffectual governments and pre-modem economies. Thus, these developments are not simply a result of industrialization or political development.
A more important factor is the discernible change in the mental constructs,
world views, and behavioral norms of large numbers of individuals from a
multitude of different cultures. Individual Africans, Asians, and Americans
have internalized the concept of rights as a response to threats against their
understandings of personal human dignity. While many of these societies may
have traditionally had concepts of collective or group rights shared by the
individuals of the given group, as well as refined conceptions of human dignity,
the idea of rights against the state for the individual qua individual appears to
have been introduced to these societies by the West. Once these new formulations of standards of human dignity have been adopted by a large enough
I
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number of individuals in a given society, reformed understandings of human
dignity and human rights become authentic standar~s of that cu~ture. ~ere
fore, the claims of cultural relativists that Western-influenced international
standards of human rights are ethnocentric impositions prove to be unfounded
if such standards have become elements of cultures across the globe. In the
African context, it may well be that a substantial majority of rural producers
hardly possess the sort of ~efined un~ersra:1ding of human .rights ~~ap~ulated
by the Universal Declaration. That said, this author s experiences li~mg m rural
West Africa suggest that the political understanding and consciousness of
African peasants is often much more sophisticated than those in the West tend
to assume.
1

Colonialism and Communism

The question then becomes one of whether evidence exists that the
globalization of standards of human dignity is in fact occurring, and if so, why?
While talk of an emerging"global village" is a common, if dated, idea congruent
to this conception, a more empirical approach to the question is needed. Th.e
fact that governments representing nations with very different cultural traditions have recognized the International Bill of Human Rights suggests that
there is evidence for the first contention. Examining how the globalization of
human dignity constructs has happened in greater depth will in turn provide
a fuller justification.
The spread of Western conceptions of human dignity and human rights is
a result of the development of two very different influences, though both with
origins in the West. As European nations colonized most of Latin America,
Africa, and Asia, individuals from Western andnon-Western cultures began an
era of sustained interaction. Colonialism introduced individuals from both
Europe and the rest of the world to differing social artifacts, goods, technical
processes, ideas, habits, and values. Paradoxically, the spread of Communist
ideologies may also have contributed to the globalization of human rights
ideals. Despite the fact that Communist doctrines have no place for individual
rights as claims against society, its conception of oppression is a powerful idea
fueling the expansion of concepts of human dignity. When coupled with the
idea of rights as a protection against threats to a dignified life, the concepts of
oppression which Communism introduced were an important contribution to
the evolution of standards of human dignity throughout the world. Colonialism itself contributed to the spread of radical ideologies, as the arrogance,
inequality, and hypocrisy of colonial rule amplified the appeal of Communist
critiques. Attempts by colonialists to inculcate indigenous peoples with
inferior self-conceptions were in part thus belied. Instead, as various individuals in different non-Western societies experienced prolonged contact with
Western ideals, their personal conceptions of human dignity were naturally
influenced by a process of acculturation. Eventually, an appreciation of new
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human rights constructs developed, too.
This is not to suggest that such cultures can now be identified as "Western."
Nor does it imply that the impact of colonialism and Communism were unidirectional, or that the West was not influenced by its colonial experience. What
is being argued is that Western culture has become to some degree globalized.
Those individuals swayed by the ideals which Communism and colonialism
upheld wed new conceptions of human dignity to their own indigenous
understandings. Even if the vast majority of individuals in a partic~ar culture
did not come into direct contact with Western ideals, new concepts filtered back
to them through those members of their society who had. Thus, while exact
understandings of human dignity and human rights may differ significantly
across cultures, most all have been influenced in an important manner by
Western constructs. For example, Articles 8 through 12 of the Universal
Declaration provide legal rights against the state, such as due process and
protection from arbitrary arrest. 16 Such understandings may well be in the
process of becoming almost universally accepted, though great cultural latitude exists among the various social institutions and legal systems upholding
this right.

In fact, given the revolutionary impact of Western technologies on preindustrialized societies in the developing world, it would be more surprising if
individuals in these nations remained unaffected by the West. The Western
cultural legacy was reinforced by the arbitrary manner in which colonial
cartographers jumbled traditional political boundaries while delimiting the
territories which were eventually granted independence as sovereign nations.
These new states, created by Western colonialism, are likely to justify their
political existence to one degree or another by Western political norms. The
claims to legitimate authority made by the elites of these states could only be
partially based on traditional norms. Thus colonialism and Communism
initiated a process by which W estem world views were introduced to societies
all over the globe.
Let us return to the question of whether evidence exists to support the
contention that a convergence of conceptions of human dignity is occurring. In
addition to the recognition of the International Bill of Human Rights by nations
around the world, other developments support the assertion of an emerging
cross-cultural understanding of human dignity. One of the first ideals to take
on such a universal appeal is the principle of self-determination. The global
acceptance of this right was one of the prime factors leading to decolonization
after World War II. There is little suggest that this ideal is more than a few
hundred years old in the West, and the same would appear to be true for much
of Africa and Asia. The widespread embrace of this principle by peoples as
diverse as the Vietnamese, Indians, Arabs, and numerous African and Carib-
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countries was a popular demand that democratic, accountable governments
which respected norms of human dignity be established.

bean societies implies that it has evolved into a cross-cultural political ideal. A
look at the experiences and impact of individuals such as Ho Chi Minh,
Mohandas Gandhi, and Kwame Nkrumah, who led the drive towards selfdetermination and decolonization in the Third World, demonstrates the influence of Western thought on the first cross-cultural understandings of human
dignity and political rights.

The Malian case is, if anything, an even clearer example of this phenomena.
The regime of General Moussa Traore, in power since a 1968 coup d'etat, had
periodically brutally repressed liberalization movements over the course of its
twenty-two year rule. However, encouraged by the events in Benin, neighboring Coted'lvoire, and elsewhere in Africa, as well as a nascent free press, several
opposition movements sprang up to challenge the Traore regime in early 1991.
Large street demonstrations took place in the capital, Bamako, in late March,
and the Army was called out to quell the disturbances. After a bloody
showdown in the streets, a reformist military clique led by Lt. Col. Amadou
Toumani Toure seized power and arrested Traore. The new regime quickly
promised to step down after new elections and organized a national convention
to draw up a democratic constitution.18 Within a year, a civilian politician,
Alpha Oumar Konare, had been elected President of Mali's new Third Republic. The key to this political transition? A popular revulsion with authoritarian
rule and a widespread desire amongst the politically informed in Mali to
implement a regime respecting political and civil rights.

Some Brief Case Studies
As with all cultural developments, the spread of new political. ideals,
habits, and values take time to manifest themselves in political institutions.
Only when the number of individuals operating on the basis of new political
ideals reaches a level akin to a " critical mass" will significant change take place.
It is now, a generation after the end of colonialism, and with the failure of
Marxist-Leninism readily apparent, that the degree of cross-cultural consensus
regarding human rights standards has made itself evident. The importance of
this consensus can be seen in the insistent calls for democratization in nations
all over the world, but its impact may be gr.e atest in Africa. This seems
particularly true in the Francophone states, where many previously authoritarian regimes have been forced to liberalize or abdicate. The driving force behind
these changes was a refusal oflarge numbersofNigeriens, Congolese, Togolese,
Cameroonians, and Gabonese, among others, to accept continued oppressive
rule by leaders willing to violate international standards of human dignity and
new understandings of basic political rights.

Black Africa is not the only region of the world where new understandings
of standards of human dignity have had major political ramifications. Even in
the Arab world, where Islamic fundamentalism has reinforced traditional
political norms and values, change can be seen. An excellent example of this is
Algeria, currently undergoing an intense struggle between fundamentalists
and a modernizing governing elite. After the former ruling party, the National
Liberation Front (FLN), turned to democratization as a method of diffusing
general political discontent, Islamic fundamentalism emerged as the most
powerful opposition movement in Algerian society. Government calculations
that the fundamentalists, organized around the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS),
could be controlled through elections proved misguided when in December,
1991, the FIS came within a hair's breath of achieving a majority in the first
round of parliamentary elections. Rather than concede power to a party
labeling democracy ''blasphemy" and promising to institute Islamic law, the
Algerian militaiy seized power. They terminated the electoral process and
cracked down on fundamentalist militants. The near-victory of Algerian
fundamentalists might seem to call into question the thesis of this paper
regarding the spread of Western political ideals. Certainly, Algeria is no Benin
or Mali. What is particularly interesting from the perspective of the argument
presented in this paper is the reaction to these events among those Algerians
opposed to the fundamentalists. Surprisingly, the Army received widespread
support from trade unions, intellectuals, and women's groups. Significant
elements of Algerian society opposed a return to the political norms and
standards of fundamentalist Islam which the FIS promised, despite an Islamic

The examples of the Beninois and Malian revolutions serve to illuminate
this point. Until 1989, Mathieu Kerekou appeared firmly in control of politics
in Benin, where a one-party state with Marxist-Leninist pretensions buttressed
the power of this military strongman. In December of that year, the seventeenyear old regime was rocked by street protests after the police opened fire on
striking students and teachers.17 What had begun as the latest in a series of
salary demands escalated into a political crisis of historic proportions. As
Africans from throughout the region followed the unfolding events in Benin
with acute interest, Kerekou was forced to concede sovereignty to a hastily
organized constitutional convention. Nicephore Soglo was chosen as Benin's
Prime Minister in a transitional government, and Kerekou was stripped of his
power.18 Free elections were called which confirmed Soglo's position as Benin's
new leader. This process, in which popular demonstrations against a repressive regime eventually resulted in democratization, set a precedent closely
noted by opposition groups throughout the continent. Though economic
frustrations were an important element fueling discontent, both those nations
among Africa's least developed and those that were relatively affluent experienced political crises, as the cases of poverty-stricken Niger and oil-rich Gabon
demonstrate. Thus, economic considerations, though significant, cannot explain these revolutionary changes. Instead, the galvanizing factor in all of these
i
i
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cultural legacy as profound as any in the region. Many of those most insistent
in their calls for democratization were willing to accept an interlude of military
rule so as to insure that their conceptions of human dignity were not violated
in the name of Islamic fundamentalism. 20 While democratization may have
been nipped at the bud, the importance placed on the respect for human rights
displayed by many Algerians suggests that it may find fertile soil in the future.
Liberalism vs. Liberal Democracy
The globalization of human rights standards can be seen in protests for
democracy all over the world. Recent work by Theodore Draper suggests that
the role played by the human rights organization Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia's
''Velvet Revolution" is another example of how conceptions of human rights
and human dignity have been the primary force in recent democratic transitions.21 Similarly, Chinese students in Tianamen Square, democrats protesting
a military coup in Thailand, and demands by Kenyans for free and fair elections
all demonstrate the adoption of universalized political values and standards
around the world. Any number of deposed autocrats and oligarchies can testify
that continued repression of human rights and democratic institutions are now
viewed as illegitimate in their nations.

13

domestic practice of democracy among the principal colonial powers and the
egalitarian justice Communism preached were attractive notions to elements of
societies in the Third World. Individuals in these regions incorporated such
concepts into their world views and political ideals, particularly those who
were more educated and politically engaged. The members of these developing
societies who are politically aware and active are often more likely to have
consciously adopted political views influenced by democratic ideas. They
associate the respect for human rights with democratic practices and are willing
to push for both.
Conclusion
It is of course true that other factors contributed to the wave of democratization we have seen and are seeing. The end of the Cold War lessened external
supports for authoritarian regimes allied with either camp. The importance of
international donor nations and lending agencies cannot be overlooked in the
African context. But the global convergence in conceptions of human dignity
and human rights have created new universal standards of political legitimacy.
These new ideals appear to be a political variable as important as any other
contributing to the demise of authoritarian regimes around the world. Additionally, it would appear that the past decade has shown that cultural norms
and values may be able to evolve in a fundamentally compatible manner.

Why democracy? A non-democratic liberal regime could theoretically be
just as effective in guaranteeing human rights. But as Giuseppe DiPalma has
observed, democracy's increasing attraction outside the West is due in large
part to its "unique virtue as protection against the oppression of arbitrary and
undivided rule."22 DiPalma terms this the "demonstration effect" as those in
the developing world observe the ability of liberal democratic nations to curtail
political oppression. The universalization of political values renders any
government's legitimacy increasingly dependent on respect for emerging
standards of human rights. Empirical observation suggests that democracies
uphold these values better than any other political system. Liberal democratic
theory is particularly relevant to such concerns with its distinction between the
public and private spheres. The very concept of human rights implies that all
political regimes are obliged to accept at least some minimal areas where the
state cannot tread. One should also note that unlimited majority rule is hardly
the ideal of the recent democratization movements. While emerging liberal
democracies in Africa and elsewhere may still be a pale reflection of their
established Western brethren, both share fundamental concerns regarding the
prevention of human deprivation and indignities.

Endnotes

There is an additional explanation of why democracy has been embraced
around the world. Colonialism and Communism did not only influence
cultural understandings of human dignity and human rights. While their
impact in these areas was probably more profound, they also influenced other
aspects of the political ideals held by individuals in the developing world. The
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While the identification of a cross-cultural norm of human rights influencing, and sometimes driving, political change in the developing world may be
a welcomed development in the West, it is hardly cause for celebration. For
while it appears that this trend will continue in the foreseeable future, though
certainly with starts and stalls, there is nothing inevitable about cultural
change. Certainly, the Fukuyama thesis identifying recent moves towards
democratization with "the end of history" is out of order. It is quite possible that
Western and non-Western political norms will begin to diverge at some point
in the future. Thus, theproblemofrelativismandhumanrightsmaybe"passe"
only in the short run. All that one can say with a degree of confidence is that
currently a global convergence in conceptions of human dignity is creating a
universal standard of human rights and that this standard is empowering
democratization in much of the world.
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On the "Blessed Assurance" of
"White Male Ways of Knowing":
Examining Confessional Discourses on Racism
By Joel Woller
Carnegie-Mellon University
''Interrogate whiteness:" such is the order of the·day. As Henry Giroux
describes it, the task is to:
·
rewrite the poli?cs .of r~presentation around race and difference by
deconstructtng m h1stor1cal and relational terms not only the central
categories of 'Otherness,' but also the dominant discourses and representations that secure 'whiteness' as a universalizing norm (9-10).
The po~tion j~t de~cribed, which Giroux attributes to bell hooks, among
others, ts of a piece with recent calls for white self-critique-calls which seem
to be .at l.eas~ partly motivated by a desire to avoid dynamics of political
org~tlon ~ which tokenized others bear the burden of reforming liberal
whit~s. ~u~, ma persuasive analysis of the contemporary identity crisis of the
~ft m Britain, Kobena Mercer proposes a narrative which emphasizes the
Importance of understanding the politics of identity in relation to questions of
coalition and alliance.
The official discourse of anti-racism failed precisely because it imposed a one-dimensional view of racial antagonism in practices such
as 'racism awareness training', which simply reinforced existing
relations of minority representation. Problems of tokenism-in which
the one black person on the committee or in the organisation is
positioned, or rather burdened, with the role of a 'representative' who
'speaks for' the entire community from which he or she comes-were
left intact. Black subjects historically marginalised from political
representation by exclusionary practices reproduced within the Left
were legitimately angry. But the encoding of such anger often took the
displaced form of 'guilt tripping' in which potential allies were
parylsed by the sins of their past. White activists recognised the
untenable innocence of their conciliatory liberal pluralism, but without a common set of terms in which to share openly criticism and
disagreements, alliance-building was inhibited by the fear of being
seen to be 'incorrect' and not 'ideologically right on' (67-8).
. As far as I know, however, no one has suggested that the proposed and I
think salutary shift from "racism awareness" to white self-critique is in any
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